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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT BETTE VJYCALIS
(860172)

Preliminary Matters
Prior to replying to Respondents Guardian Title Company of
Utah and Warren H. Curliss, its President, (hereinafter
"Guardian") arguments on the merits, Appellant Bette Wycalis
(hereinafter "Wycalis") would like to address three preliminary
matters.
A.

"Reversal"
Guardian asserts that Wycalis asked this court to find

liability on the part of Guardian as a matter of law
(Guardian's Brief page 13); and, as a consequence of this
"extraordinary" relief (Guardian's Brief page 7) Wycalis must
carry a heavier burden tnan would be required in the more
1

"routine case" (Guardian's Brief p a 9 e 13). In this instance,
and m

other arguments throughout its Brief, Guardian is

endeavoring to confuse the issue before this court.

That

Guardian's argument with respect to the "reversal" question is
incorrect and erroneous is easily demonstrated.
Guardian urges that it is Wycalis' position that this court
should hold Guardian liable as a matter of law.

(Guardian's

Brief page 7, 112.) Clearly, Wycalis has not requested such
relief (Wycalis1 Brief page 31) and would not be entitled to
such relief since Wycalis did not file a Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment and did not request a ruling on her Motion for
Summary Judgment dated February 21, 1985.

(R. 219.)

Guardian's characterization of Wycalis' position is completely
erroneous and is the first of many instances m which Guardian
endeavors to confuse the issues before this court.
B.

"Prooer" Acknowledcenent, Utah Code Anne. §57-2*1 et seq.
Guardian has asserted for the first tine on this appeal

tnat the request for reconveyance in this case was "properly
acknowledged*.

(Guardian's Brief page 1G, Tl.)

This assertion

is contrary to tne facts of record and Utah statute.
It has Deen assumed DV Guardian tnat tne request for
reconveyance in this matter was a forgery.
page 11, T3.)

(Guardian's Brief

Guardian now asserts for the first time on

appeal tnat the acknowledgement was "proper!} acKnowledgec"
pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §57*2*1 et seq.
2

(Guardian's Brief

page 10, 111.) Since this is the first time this defense has
been raised, it may not be properly addressed on appeal.
(Turtle Management Inc. v, Haggis Management Inc., 645 P.2d
667, Utah 1982.)

Further, since whether the acknowledgment is

properly acknowledged pertains to the issue of forgery; that
is, if the acknowledgement is proper, the signature of Wycalis
was not a forgery, it follows that the assertion of proper
acknowledgment is contradictory to the assumption of forgery.
Secondly, the signatures on the request are not properly
acknowledged under the statute.

The statute sets forth the

form of acknowledgement which must be used if the grantor is
unknown to the notary.

(Utah Code Anno. §57*2*8.)

This

section provides a specific form which was not used on the
request for reconveyance.

The form under §57-2*8 is the only

acknowledgement form which would have been appropriate since
the notary did not know the signers of the note.

(Wycalis

Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Statement of Fact
#20.)

Since the acknowledgement form required by this section

was not used, the request was not properly acknowledged.
Further, §57*2^12 provides as follows:
No certificate of such proof shall be made unless such
subscribing witness shall prove that the person whose name
is subscribed thereto as a party is the person described
m , and who executed, the same; that such person executed
the conveyance, and that such person subscribed his name
thereto as a witness thereof at the request of the maker of
such instrument.
Clearly, since Guardian assumes the request to be a
3

forgery, the requirements of this statutory provision cannot be
satisfied.

Hence, the request is not properly acknowledged

under the statute.
C.

Citation to Authority
Finally, it should be noted that Guardian has raised much

clamor in asserting that Wycalis, on this appeal, has "wholly
failed" to support her position with applicable legal
authority.

(E.g. Guardian's Brief page 24, 1(2; "None of the

plaintiff's legal authorities even come close to dealing with
the issue before this court.")

Uycalis directs the court's

attention to the fact that Wycalis has supported her position
with approximately two dozen cases from varying jurisdictions,
as well as an extensive annotation m

the American Law Reports

(90 ALR2d 495), all of which deal squarely with the issue of
fiduciary relations between a trustee and a beneficiary under a
deed of trust and, more specifically, with unauthorized
reconveyances.
In contrast, Guardian has argued that this Court should
render its decision in this case, a case of first impression in
this state, based upon a single case, decided by this Court,
involving third party negligence in a claim for wrongful death
in a murder committed by a stranger.
could not be more striking.

The contrast in positions

It is Wycalis' position that this

Court should decide this case, which is of fundamental
importance to the financial community of this state, based upon
4

the law applicable to fiduciaries under deeds of trust, not the
law applicable to strangers and wrongful death.
ARGUMENT
Viewed in its totality, it is Guardian's position:

1) that

trustees owe no duty to beneficiaries under the Utah trust deed
statute which requires satisfaction of the debt prior to
reconveyance; 2) that Guardian owes no duty to the beneficiary
by reason of the language of the request for reconveyance which
requires delivery of the promissory note and trust deed to the
trustee prior to reconveyance; 3) that any duty which the
trustee owed in this case was satisfied by Guardian in relying
upon a forged, purportedly acknowledged (not "properly"
acknowledged) request for reconveyance; and, 4) the trustee was
not negligent in reconveying, unless it had reason to believe
the request was forged because of the indicia of trustworthy
ness which attaches to acknowledgments.

Wycalis addresses

those issues in that order.
POINT I
GUARDIAN OWES A DUTY TO WYCALIS UNDER UTAH CODE
ANNO. §57-1-33 (1953)
Cross Reference:
Wycalis1 Brief, Point I, pages 10 A 14;
Guardian's Brief, Point II, pages 20 * 23.
It is Guardian's position that the following language
imposes no duty upon a trustee to know that a beneficiary has
been paid prior to reconveyance:
5

"When the obligation secured

by any trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon
written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust
property."

(Utah Code Anno. §57<*1«33, 1953.)

Uycalis argues that this statutory provision creates a duty
on the part of the trustee to know that the obligation has been
satisfied prior to reconveyance.

This position is supported in

her appellant's brief by citation to Utah case law which states
that it is the primary responsibility of a trustee to insure
payment of the secured debt.

(Blodgett v. Marsch, 590 P.2d

298, Utah 1978.)
It would appear to be Guardian's position that the
above^quoted statutory language does not create a duty upon the
trustee because the statute is severable.

That is, that

portion of the statute which requires satisfaction of the debt
may be disregarded by the trustee and that the trustee's only
duty is to divest its beneficiary of the beneficiary's security
interest.

(Guardian's Brief page 22.)

This position, which is

unsupported by authority, is untenable and contradicts the
Blodgett decision of this Court which states that the trustee's
primary obligation is to see that the debt is paid.

(Blodgett

at 303.)
Guardian counters by arguing that an acknowledgment has
numerous indicia of trustworthiness, including a presumption of
genuineness, self^authentication under the Utah Rules of
Evidence, and that an acknowledged document is entitled to be
6

recorded at the office of the County Recorder,

However,

Guardian's reliance upon the indicia of trustworthiness ignores
two important considerations.

First, the factors cited by

Guardian (acknowledged documents are self-authenticating, etc.)
are only a reflection of the indicia of trustworthiness given
the signature(s) on an acknowledged document and the only issue
to which the trustworthiness of the signatures is relevant is
that of payment.

These factors, no matter how ingrained

m

Utah law, cannot be aggregated to overpower the fact that the
best evidence of payment is the surrender of the note itself,
which in this case was required by the terms of the request for
reconveyance, but was not accomplished by Guardian.

Secondly,

the presumption of authenticity, and here the indicia of
trustworthiness, is rebutted by a showing of clear and
convincing evidence.
515.)

(Acknowledgements §1051, 1 Am.Jur.2nd

A showing which was clearly made m

this case in view of

Guardian's assumption of forgery.
POINT II
ISSUES CONCERNING SURRENDER OF
PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST DEED
Cross Reference:
Wycalis1 Brief, Point II, pages 14-17;
Guardian's Brief, Point III.B.l. and 2., pages 25*28.
A.

This Matter is not Raised for First Time on Appeal.

At the trial level, Wycalis advanced the theory that Guardian
had breached the fiduciary duty owed Wycalis.
7

(Memorandum in

Opposition to Summary Judgment, Points III and IV; R.
441^446.)

In support of this position, Wycalis argued numerous

facts in support of the breach.

Specifically, that Wycalis did

not authorize the reconveyance; did not sign the request for
reconveyance; did not authorize another to sign the request on
her behalf; does not know who signed her name to the request;
did not know the notary who notarized the request; that
Guardian did not connunicate with Uycalis prior to reconveyance
to deternme whether the note had been paid; and that Guardian
did not require delivery of the original note and trust deed,
but rather relied upon the notarized signature on a request for
reconveyance.

(Wycalis1 Memorandum m

Opposition to Summary

Judgment; R. 444.)
Guardian now endeavors to nischaracterlze Wycalis1 citation
of this fact as a "principal argunent on appeal" which was not
raised at the trial level.

Guardian further argues that since

the "matter" was not raised at the trial level, this Court is
precluded from addressing the same.

However, consistent with

other arguments made by Guardian, after Guardian asserts that
Wycalis did not raise the matter at trial, Guardian immediately
concedes that Wycalis did raise this issue at the trial level,
but only "in one sentence" which cane "[o]ut of the blue".
(Guardian's Brief page 25.)
Guardian's position is flawed for two reasons.

First, the

issue of possession of the original note and trust deed was
8

argued and emphasized at the trial level.

Specifically,

Wycalis cited California authority (Huckle v. Martranga, 160
Cal.Rptr. 177, 1979; Wycalis1 Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment; R. 444) stating that, prior to reconveyance,
it was incumbent upon a trustee to know that the original note
and trust deed were not in the hands of a bona fide purchaser
for value in order to keep the trustee from liability.

Wycalis

also argued to the trial court that the failure of the trustee
to require delivery was factual evidence of the failure of the
trustee to satisfy the fiduciary duty.

(Wycalis Memorandum in

Opposition to Summary Judgment; R. 444.)

Secondly, Guardian is

in error because the possession of the original note and trust
deed is a fact of record at the trial level and is contained in
Statement of Fact #34 of Wycalis' Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment.

(R. 438-439.)

Finally, it is established law that only issues which are
not raised at the trial level are precluded on appeal.
v. Cayias, 431 P.2d 788, Utah 1967.)

(Riter

In this case, the issue

of breach of fiduciary was clearly before the trial court as
were the facts, including the fact of failure of delivery,
relied upon and argued by Wycalis in support of that theory.
B.
deed.

Evidence concerning surrender of the note and trust
Guardian also asserts that there is "no evidence in the

record" that surrender of the promissory note and trust deed is
required.

(Guardian's Brief page 26.)
9

Inconsistently,

Guardian then immediately concedes that there is evidence that
surrender is required and that this evidence is the language in
the request which states that the promissory note and trust
deed are delivered into the possession of the trustee.
(Guardian's Brief page 26.)

Guardian then requests this Court

to selectively enforce the terms of the request, arguing,
without citation to authority, that the request "imposes no
legal duty on Guardian".

That "[i]t is simply a preprinted

form and nothing more"; that the document has no force of law
and "is completely ineffective to impose any legal duties [sic]
on Guardian."

(Guardian's Brief page 27.)

This position is in diametrical opposition to Guardianfs
argument in which it asserts that as trustee, Guardian has
completely satisfied any duty owed Wycalis by relying upon the
request.
clear.

(Guardian's Brief page 14.)

The inconsistency is

At page 14 of Guardian's brief, the trustee urges that

it is entitled to rely with impunity upon and can be kept from
liability by virtue of that portion of the request which
authorizes the reconveyance, but, at page 26, Guardian argues
that the trustee can ignore that portion of the request which
requires delivery of the note and trust deed into the
possession of the trustee.

Not inconsistently, Guardian offers

no authority in support of either position.
Guardian's argument is consistent, however, with its other
unsupported arguments.

For example, Guardian has urged this
10

Court hold that Utah Code Anno. §57-<l~33, which states that a
trustee shall reconvey after the debt is satisfied, imposes
only a duty to reconvey, and no duty to ascertain whether the
debt has been paid.

(Guardian's Brief page 22.)

Taken to

their logical conclusion, the arguments show that it Guardian's
position that a trustee under a deed of trust simply has no
duty at all to protect the beneficiary's interest.

Such a

position is incompatible with this Court's holding in Blodgett
wherein the Court stated that the primary obligation of a
trustee is to insure payment of the obligation secured.
Guardian's position is also contrary to established law from
other jurisdictions.

Wycalis has previously directed this

Court's attention to the case of Huckle v. Martranga, wherein
that California court held that:

"Knowing that the note has

been paid and is not in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value is, therefore, essential to keep the trustee free from
liability."

(Id. at 181, cited m Wycalis Brief page 19.)

The fact of the possession of the note was of record before
the trial court, the fact that Guardian failed to require
delivery to it of the note was argued to the trial court, a
point which is conceded by Guardian (Guardian's Brief page 25),
and the nondelivery was asserted by Wycalis as further factual
proof of the breach of the fiduciary duty.
POINT III
LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING A CONCLUSION
OF BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY

11

Cross Reference:
Wycalis1 Brief pages 10 * 20;
Guardian's Brief pages 22 - 24.
Guardian asserts that there is no evidence of record which
would require it to do more than it has done in the protection
of Wycalis1 interest.

(Guardian's Brief page 23.)

The simple

answer to this proposition is that Guardian executed a deed of
reconveyance upon a forged request for reconveyance without a)
seeking to locate the evidence of the debt; b) without
inquiring about the location of the original deed of trust;
and, c) without inquiring of the beneficiary concerning
payment.

Further, whether Guardian should have done more in

protecting Wycalis' interest is a question of lav; to be decided
by this court.

The real question is what legal authority this

court finds persuasive and what legal theory comports with
prior Utah decisions.

In this regard, Wycalis respectfully

urges that this court should adopt that law applicable to
fiduciaries under deeds of trust as reflected in those cases
cited in her brief, and not the law of wrongful death and
negligence of third parties as urged by Guardian.
Guardian endeavors to distinguish the cases relied upon by
Wycalis; and here Guardian's arguments exceed the bounds of
credibility.

(Guardian's Brief Point III.A.2., page 23 «* 24.)

At pages 23 and 24 of Guardian's Brief, the trustee asserts
that Wycalis' legal authority is distinguishable from the case
12

at bar because "... in every one of those cases the
reconveyance ... was entirely unauthorized . ..."
added.)

(Emphasis not

It must be supposed then that it is Guardian's

position that the reconveyance in this case was "a little bit"
authorized or "somewhat authorized".

This is the logical

equivalent of inquiring whether a court has "some jurisdiction"
or if a woman is "a little bit pregnant".

The simple fact

which Guardian goes to great length and effort to obscure is
that it is Guardian who has assumed that the request was a
forgery.

That being the case, for purposes of this appeal, the

request is unauthorized and Guardian can not now be heard to
argue that the request was in some manner authorized.
Since the request in the case at bar was unauthorized, and
since, even according to Guardian (Guardian's Brief page 23),
the cases relied upon by Wycalis involve unauthorized
reconveyances, it is the assumption of forgery, and the law
which applies to that assumption, which should apply to the
case at bar.
POINT IV
ISSUES CONCERNING THE FORESEEABILITY OF THE FORGERY
Cross Reference:
Wycalis' Brief, Point IV, page 22 «* 24;
Guardian's Brief, Point IV, page 28 «4 37.
A.

Even if this court adopts the trial court's approach,

Guardian is liable to Wycalis because Guardian was on notice by

13

reason of the nondelivery of the original note and trust deed,
Wycalis has addressed Guardian's principal arguments
concerning the duty to foresee a criminal act m
Point V.

(Wycalis1 Brief page 22 - 24.)

her brief at

Her position stated

there is basically that the authorities cited by Guardian are
inapplicable and distinguishable upon their facts.

That is,

the law of wrongful death and third-party negligence should not
be applied to a case involving fiduciaries under a deed of
trust.

However, even if this court should adopt the approach

taken by the trial court; that is there is no negligence unless
the forgery was foreseeable, Guardian is still liable to
Wycalis.

This is so because the nondelivery of the original

note and trust deed with the request for reconveyance put
Guardian on notice.

This conclusion is supported by case law.

In Koehn v. Central National Insurance Company, 354 P.2d 352
(Kan. 1960), the court stated that notice "means intelligence
by whatever means communicated, information, knowledge",
Certainly, the absence of the original note and trust deed,
which according to terms of the request for reconveyance were
delivered with the request, but which m

fact were not

delivered with the request for reconveyance, put the trustee on
notice.
This position is consistent with the decision in Harvey v.
Guaranty Trust Company, 134 Misc. 417, 236 N.Y.S. 37, affirmed
256 N.Y. 526, 177 N.E. 126 (1929), in which the court addressed
14

the question of a trustee's liability where the trustee
released the security under a trust deed without requiring
presentation of all of the bonds secured.

The court held that

the absence of the bonds placed the trustee upon notice of the
possibility that there might be outstanding bonds in the hands
of persons entitled to enforce them.

(Cited in 90 ALR2d at

551.)
Therefore, should this court elect to adopt the approach
taken by the trial court, Guardian is still liable to Wycalis
because Guardian was on notice by reason of the nondelivery of
the original trust deed and note.
B.

The foreseeability of the criminal act is irrelevant to the

case at bar because the criminal act was not the cause of
Wycalis' loss.
Cross Reference:
Wycalis Brief Point V page 22 - 24;
Guardian's Brief Point IV page 28 «06.
Cuardian first argues that Wycalis is barred from advancing
the arguments as to why the trial court erred in ruling that
the trustee had no duty to foresee the criminal acts of
others.

It is Guardian's position that because the arguments

were not made at the trial level, they should not be considered
on appeal.

(Guardian's Brief page 34.)

however, clear and to the contrary.

The record is,

It has been Wycalis1

position from the inception that Guardian's arguments
15

concerning the duty to foresee a criminal act are irrelevant to
the issue before this court (Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment Point II; R. 440). Further, it is clear from
Guardian's memorandum that Guardian intended to rely upon the
theory (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
R. 388) and hence the trial court was fairly apprised of the
theory and in fact relied upon the theory and its decision,
(R. 520*522.)

Therefore, the issue of the foreseeability of a

criminal act is before this court and Wycalis is entitled to
address that issue.

(See Robinson Investment Company v.

Greenrose Associates, 448 P.2d 440, Ariz. 1969.)
As stated in Wycalis' Memorandum in Opposition to Summary
Judgment (R. 440) the issue of the foreseeability of a criminal
act is irrelevant to the case at bar and Guardian's reliance
upon Scott v. Gray and §448 in the Restatement of Torts, Second
is misplaced.

As was stated at the trial level:

Whether Guardian's acts were in good faith is of no concern
here, nor are the assertions concerning the duty, or
absence thereof, to foresee a criminal act. Plaintiff's
claim against Guardian is not based upon a failure to act
in good faith or for failing to foresee a criminal act, but
rather, for negligence for failing to know, or failing to
take reasonable steps to know, that the debt owed
beneficiary had, prior to reconveyance, been paid. (R.
440.)
The reason for which the foreseeability of a criminal act
is not an issue in this case is that the criminal act was not
the cause of Wycalis' loss.

It is stipulated that Wycalis lost

her security when Guardian reconveyed the trust property.
16

(Guardian Statement of Undisputed Facts #8 and #14, Memorandum
in Support of Motion of Guardian Title Company and Warren H.
Curliss for Summary Judgment, R. 386, 387,)

Wycalis suffered

no loss by reason of the acts of the unknown forger, Wycalis'
loss was occasioned by the acts, or omissions, of Guardian.

As

such, Guardian's reliance on the Scott decision is unwarranted
because in that case the injuries were caused by the criminal
act.

Similarly, Guardianls reliance on §448 of the Restatement

of Torts, Second is inappropriate because that section involves
superseding causes.

In the case at bar, the criminal act was

not the cause of the loss.

Therefore, §448 is not applicable.
CONCLUSION

The fundamental question for decision may be stated as
follows:
Upon receiving a request for reconveyance, what is
required of a trustee of a deed of trust in order to
protect the beneficiary's interest and to keep the trustee
from liability?
It is Wycalis' position that, whichever theory is adopted
by this court, the exclusive reliance by the trustee upon a
purportedly acknowledged request for reconveyance, without
inquiry about, or delivery of, the original promissory note and
trust deed, does not satisfy the fiduciary duty owed VJycalis by
the trustee.

This position is well supported in the case law

of other jurisdictions and by four important policy
considerations, considerations to which Guardian has made no
response and therefore concedes.
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Appellant Wycalis respectfully urges that the trial court
erred in granting Guardian's Motion for Summary Judgment and
requests that court's judgment be reversed.
Dated:

December H,

1986.
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